Indo-Pakistani water relations are bound, limited and defined by the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. The treaty divides the resources of the Indus Basin, one of the largest and oldest basins on the planet, and states that India will have control over the waters of the three eastern rivers of the basin (the Ravi, the Sutlej and the Beas) and that Pakistan will have control over the waters of the three western rivers (the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum). The treaty then goes on to set out the rights and obligations of the riparians and, importantly, allows India to avail itself of the waters of the western rivers for domestic consumption, non-consumptive functions, limited agricultural use and for hydroelectric purposes.
So far, the treaty has held strong. However, because of a variety of factors, some voices are accusing India of stealing Pakistan’s water and violating the treaty. I will not dwell upon these voices in this article because they are incorrect and, as I will try to show, they can be made irrelevant. However, some factors providing these voices their motives and reasons must be acknowledged: the mistrust that characterises Indo-Pakistani relations, gross mismanagement of water resources within Pakistan, outdated irrigation practices, poorly planned agricultural zoning, a rising population and resultant water scarcity.
What these voices are doing is choosing to ignore Pakistan’s most pressing political, economic, social and environmental issues, and instead are looking for solace in the age-old chestnut: India is to blame. What else explains the reason given for having more troops deployed on its eastern border than its western, when the trouble so clearly is: to ensure water security?
One of the problems in Indo-Pakistani water relations, as far as Pakistan is concerned, is that, thanks to Sir Cyril Radcliff and the outcome of English colonialism in India, Pakistan is a lower riparian. What the treaty does is set up a riparian hegemony by dividing the resources of the Indus Basin, creating an asymmetrical relationship between the two riparians and cementing India’s position as the riparian hegemon. In other words, the treaty stacks the cards against Pakistan and makes it close to impossible for it to rationalise the disproportionate relative bargaining positions the treaty allocates. This is because, in practice, the more powerful riparian is loath to give up the benefits it has.
There are some who suggest that, for this very reason, the treaty should be scrapped and another negotiated. To these gifted geniuses, I ask this: Very well, then, but what brilliant strategy do you have hidden away that will outmanoeuvre the riparian hegemon and get the lower riparian more than it already has under the treaty? This question is met with silence.
How can Pakistan get itself out of this situation? The answer is simple: Don’t look at the Indus Water Treaty for solutions. The treaty is based on a sort of divide-the-resource-of-the-Indus-Basin theory, which will always result in a zero-sum game for Pakistan. What we need is to look outside the “divide the resource” paradigm and look towards the opportunities afforded by the “sharing the resource” paradigm. What we need to do is see whether it is in the economic, social or political interest of both riparians to cooperate on water, rather than be antagonistic over it. What we need is a trans-boundary water opportunity analysis.
Trans-boundary analysis looks at the positive sum outcomes of sharing the resources of a water basin. The approach is unique, in that it allows the weaker riparian to offer the hegemon some additional benefit.
The idea would be to conduct a full-spectrum trans-boundary water opportunity analysis that will identify the areas where cooperation between India and Pakistan over the waters of the Indus Basin will yield in economic, social or other benefits. For example, if India is building run-of-the-river dams on the western rivers, this need not be a cause of alarm in Pakistan. After all, what keeps Pakistan from purchasing the electricity from India? We are more than willing to pay an extortionately high cost for electricity from diesel-powered rental power projects when everyone knows hydroelectric power is a fraction of the cost.
Selling electricity to Pakistan would also be in the economic interests of India because of the premiums it could charge. Similarly, there could be economic benefit to India if it allowed Pakistan to expand, say, its fisheries along the eastern rivers. The purpose of the trans-boundary water opportunity analysis would be to identify and quantify the all the possible positive sum outcomes of a “sharing the resource” strategy. The wider the scope of such an analysis, the more chances of identifying more and more areas of cooperation.
The analysis would involve other issues as well. One would be the identification of what sort of “green water” resources exist (as in water that falls from the sky, and distinct from “blue water” which is, essentially surface water) and how such resources could be harnessed for the benefit of either India or Pakistan. (The study of “green water” is rare, as most hydrologists tend to ignore something they can’t pipe, and government doesn’t care about stuff it can’t tax.) The inclusion of such things could widen the overall opportunities, at least in Pakistan, of harnessing the water resources of the country.
The economic science of sharing resources is also cutting-edge. Elinor Ostrom was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize for Economic Sciences this year for her study of shared resources. I had the opportunity of meeting Ms Ostrum last month and to speak to her about Indo-Pakistani water relations. She hadn’t studied the Indus Basin (she has studied others), but told me that, should the two countries ever decide to go down such a path, the only problems they would encounter would be working out the right profit-sharing formulas.
And, finally, in the Pakistani context again, if Pakistan could be seen sitting down with India and doing something large-scale, without the rhetoric of Kashmir or terrorism clouding the way, it would create enormous international goodwill that, surely, Pakistan could leverage to its advantage.
On almost all counts, it is impossible to deny how attractive a proposition a trans-boundary water opportunity analysis is. It’s difficult to judge how the governments of these countries would respond to the call for such an analysis. Perhaps this is not the time for such a call and perhaps it isn’t for the governments of the countries to conduct such an analysis. At this stage, the opportunities of sharing the resource of the Indus Basin are the perfect place for players in Track-II diplomacy to pick up the gauntlet and show their respective governments the way forward.
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